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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal on transfer from the
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED BY UTA'S CROSS-APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting Serratos an extension

of time in the absence of a showing of good cause or extraordinary circumstances
establishing excusable neglect. The trial court's determination of excusable neglect for
failure to timely commence an appeal is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Prowswood? Inc.
v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.. 676 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah 1984). This issue was preserved in
UTA's memorandum in opposition to Serratos3 motion to extend time to appeal. (R. 254268)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED BY SERRATOS3 APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court correcdy determined as a matter of law that Serratos5

claims against UTA were barred by their failure to comply with the notice of claim
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The trial court's application of the
Governmental Immunity Act is an issue of law reviewed for correctness. Trujillo v. Utah
Dept. of Transp.? 1999 Utah Ct. App. 227 UH 11-12, 986 P.2d 752, 757. This issue was
preserved in UTA's memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment.
(R. 13-27)

2.

Whether the trial court correctly determined that failure to satisfy the notice

requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act precludes application of the savings
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 to Serratos' claims. The trial court's application
of the statutory savings provisions is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Hebertson
v. Bank One Utah. N.A., 1999 Utah Ct. App. 342 1111 6-7, 995 P.2d 7, 9. This issue was
preserved in UTA's combined reply/opposition memorandum. (R. 141-143)
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION. STATUTES.
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Rule 4(a). Utah R.App.P.:
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial
court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be
filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of
the judgment or order appealed from. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1965. as amended 1991):
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the claim
were against a private person begins to run.
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or
against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority
shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an
action, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
(3)

(a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known.
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent,
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and
(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13.

(4)

(a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent and
without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant may apply
to the court to extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(b)
(i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court may
extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applicable
statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially
prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1965, as amended 1987):
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its employees for an act or
omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed
with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after the claim
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 6330-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
Utah Code Ann. <S 78-12-40:
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment thereon for the
plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or
contract for commencing the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he
dies and the cause of action survives, his representatives, may commence a
new action within one year after the reversal or failure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a personal injury action arising from a collision between a pickup truck and a

UTA bus on December 17,1996. On December 8,1997, Serratos served a notice of claim
on Steven H. Cain, Risk Manager for UTA and David C. Pitcher, Claims Adjuster for
UTA. Neither of these gentlemen is a member of UTA's Board of Directors. Notice was

i

also served on the Attorney General. No notice of claim was ever served on the UTA Board
of Directors, as required by Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11 and 13.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
After Serratos commenced their litigation, UTA moved for summary judgment on

the grounds that Serratos had failed to comply with the provisions of the Governmental
Immunity Act for service of their notice of claim. Serratos filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment on the notice of claim issue and for a determination that they were
permitted one additional year under the savings provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40
to correctly serve a notice of claim on UTA's Board of Directors and to refile their
complaint.
On August 5,1999, the trial court granted UTA's motion and denied Serratos5
cross-motion. The court entered an Order of Dismissal on August 26, 1999. On
August 31,1999, counsel for UTA mailed Serratos5 counsel a Rule 58A Notice of Entry of
Judgment and a copy of the Order of Dismissal.
On October 1,1999, six days after the time for filing a notice of appeal had expired,
Serratos filed a motion to extend the time to appeal. Without oral argument or entry of any
findings in support of such an extension, the trial court granted Serratos5 motion by minute
entry dated October 27,1999, and entered an order extending the time to appeal on
November 8,1999. Serratos filed their notice of appeal with the trial court on
November 2,1999. UTA filed a timely notice of a cross-appeal on November 15,1999.

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about December 17,1996, Cristobal Serrato was driving his pickup truck

with his wife Elida Serrato as a passenger when the truck collided with a UTA bus driven
by Lance K. Sargent. The Serratos were both injured in the accident.
On December 8,1997, the Serratos served Steven H. Cain, Risk Manager for UTA
and David C. Pitcher, Claims Adjuster for UTA with a Notice of Claim for Injury dated
December 2,1997. (R. 179, copy attached as Addendum A-l.) The notice indicates that
Attorney General Jan Graham may also have been served. (R. 179) No notice of claim was
ever served on the UTA Board of Directors.
Steven H. Cain is the Risk Manager for UTA and reports to UTA's director of
finance. He is not an officer of UTA or a member or employee of the Board of Directors.
He is not a registered agent of UTA. He was not hired by the Board of Directors and does
not report to the Board or routinely attend Board meetings. He does not keep minutes or
records for the Board or provide notice of Board meetings. (R. 24-25, copy of Affidavit of
Steven H. Cain is attached as Addendum A-2.)
Mr. Cain's immediate supervisor is Kenneth D. Montague, Jr., the Director of
Finance. Mr. Montague in turn reports to the General Manager, John M. Inglish, who in
turn reports to the Board of Directors. (R. 146)
David C. Pitcher is the claims adjuster for UTA and reports to Steven H. Cain, Risk
Manager. He is not an officer of UTA or a member or employee of the Board of Directors.
He is not a registered agent of UTA. He was not hired by the Board, does not report to

tiie Board and does not routinely attend Board meetings. He does not keep minutes or
records for the Board or provide notice of Board meetings. (R. 26-27, copy of Affidavit of
David C. Pitcher is attached as Addendum A-3.)
Serratos commenced their action in the Third District Court by filing a complaint on
April 16,1998 (R. 1-4) and serving a summons on the UTA Board of Directors, Jim Clark,
Chairman, on April 27,1998. (R. 5-7) On July 21,1998, UTA filed a motion for
summary judgment based upon the Serratos5 failure to comply with the notice of claim
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11 and 13.
(R. 13-27) On January 19,1999, Serratos filed a cross-motion for summary judgment
arguing, among other things, that even if the trial court determined the notice of claim to
be improperly served that they were entided under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 to correct

(

the deficiency by serving a new notice and refiling their action. (R. 84-91) The trial court
entered a minute entry on August 5,1999, granting UTA's motion and denying the
Serratos3 motion. (R. 246-48) A Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal was entered
on August 26,1999. (R.249-51)
On August 31,1999, counsel for UTA mailed a Rule 58A Notice of Entry of
Judgment and a copy of the order to counsel for the Serratos which identified August 26 as
the date of entry of the order. (R. 252-53, copy attached as Addendum A-4.)

*

September 25, the last day on which to file a notice of appeal, passed without a notice being
filed. Six days later, on October 1,1999, the Serratos filed with the trial court a motion to
extend the time to appeal. (R. 269-70) Without oral argument or entry of any supporting

^

findings, the trial court granted Serratos3 motion by minute entry dated October 27,1999.
(R. 294-95) The court entered an order extending the time to appeal, containing no
findings or justification for the order, on November 8,1999. (R. 301-02, copy attached as
Addendum A-5.) The Serratos filed their notice of appeal with the trial court on
November 2,1999. (R. 296-98) UTA filed a timely notice of cross-appeal on
November 15,1999. (R. 306-307)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Serratos had adequate and timely notice of the entry of a final order and
judgment against them disposing of all claims as to all parties and that the time for filing
their notice of appeal had begun to run. They failed to file within the requisite 30-day
period. Six days later, they belatedly applied to the trial court for an extension of time to
appeal, the granting of which was a reversible abuse of discretion by the trial court. Because
Serratos failed to timely commence their appeal, this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain
the appeal and the trial court had no authority to restore that jurisdiction. The appeal must
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Even if the Court finds jurisdiction to conduct the appeal in this matter, the
judgment of the trial court must be affirmed because Serratos failed to comply with the
mandatory service of notice of claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
An individual's right to sue a governmental entity is a statutorily created right subject
to strict construction of the governing statutory provisions. The Utah courts have, except
in very unique circumstances, consistently rejected equitable exceptions to the governmental

immunity requirements, including the notice of claim provisions. The notice of claim at
issue here was drafted and filed by qualified legal counsel, not by an unsophisticated plaintiff
acting pro se. Even to the extent that any limited equitable exceptions have been
recognized, it is not appropriate to extend any such exceptions to one who is qualified to
research, understand and comply with the notice of claim requirements. Moreover, the
notice of claim provisions in the Governmental Immunity Act function as a statute of
limitations and are not simply procedural in nature. Failure to comply with these
requirements acts as a bar to a claim, not just a curable procedural defect.
The trial court correcdy determined that the Serratos' claims are barred by their
failure to comply with the notice requirements. Its entry of summary judgment should be
affirmed.

{

Because the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act function as a
statute of limitation which bars a plaintiffs claims for failure to comply, the provisions of
the Utah savings statute do not permit Serratos to cure this fatal jurisdictional defect by
filing a new notice of claim and recommencing this action. The trial court therefore
{

properly dismissed their claims with prejudice. This Court should therefore affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
i

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE
SERRATOS AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPEAL IN THE ABSENCE
OF AN ADEQUATE SHOWING SUPPORTING A FINDING OF GOOD
CAUSE OR EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES ESTABLISHING
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT.
The Serratos' counsel, an experienced litigator, knew that the trial court had decided

to grant summary judgment against his clients shortly after the minute entry had been made
on August 5,1999, and a copy mailed to him. By September 1st or 2nd, he had in his
possession a Rule 58A Notice of Entry of Judgment which expressly identified August 26 as
the date of entry of judgment and a copy of the dated order entered by the trial court. He
nonetheless failed to file a timely notice of appeal with the trial court before the allotted 30
days for allowing such an appeal had run. Six days later he applied to the trial court for an
extension of time in which to appeal. Without a finding of good cause or excusable neglect,
the trial court granted the requested extension. In doing so, the trial court abused its
discretion.
The plain and unambiguous language of Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides for 30 days within which to prepare and file a notice of appeal.
Appeal From Final Judgment and Order. In a case in which an appeal
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate
court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the
clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from. . . .

n

Rule 4(a), Utah R.App.P. (emphasis added). It is the date of entry which controls and not
the point at which a party is notified of the entry of judgment. The service of a copy of the
signed judgment, whether timely made or not, does not affect the 30-day filing deadline.
Notice of Signing or Entry of Judgment. A copy of the signed
judgment shall be promptly served by the party preparing it in the
manner provided in Rule 5. The time for filing a notice of appeal is
not affected by the requirement of this provision.
Rule 58A(d), Utah R. Civ. P. (emphasis added).
c

Tt is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that failure to timely perfect an appeal is a

jurisdictional failure requiring dismissal of the appeal." Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah 1984). See also Albretson v. Tudd, 709 P.2d 347,
348 (Utah 1985) (court raised timeliness issue sua sponte and dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction); Estate of Ratliff In re? 431 P.2d 571, 573 (Utah 1967) (court had no
jurisdiction where notice of appeal filed 7 days late). Only if a party demonstrates excusable
neglect or good cause under Rule 4(e) may a trial court extend the time for initiating an
appeal after the 30-day period has run. Under that rule, neglect is excusable only where the
circumstances are unique or extraordinary. Pontarelli v. Stone. 930 R2d 104, 111 (1st Cir.
1991).

cc

When the question of'excusable neglect3 arises in a jurisdictional context as

opposed to a non-jurisdictional context, the standard contemplated thereby is necessarily a
strict one.33 Prowswood 676 P.2d at 959 (citations omitted, emphasis added). This strict
standard is important to avoid removing the consequences from simple failure to file a
timely notice of appeal. See In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc.. 769 R2d 911, 917 (2d
Cir. 1985) (cca loose interpretation of'excusable neglect5 would convert the 30-day period
in

for appeal provided in FRAP 4(a) into a 60-day one—a result clearly not intended by the
Rule's framers33).
The rule does not apply in the absence of facts supporting a judicial finding that such
unique or extraordinary circumstances are present. Prowswood 676 P.2d at 960, citing
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Conner. 382 F.2d 13,16-17 (10th Cir. 1967). "Inadvertence or
mistake of counsel does not constitute the type of unique or extraordinary circumstances
contemplated by this strict standard." Prowswood 676 P.2d at 960.1 Excusable neglect
under Rule 4 "refers to the missing of a deadline as a result of such things as
misrepresentations by judicial officers, lost mail, and plausible misinterpretations of
ambiguous rules." Prizevoits v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 76 F.3d 132,134 (7th Cir.
1996) (finding no excusable neglect where experienced attorney failed to follow rule).
An indication of the high threshold for excusable neglect is contained in two cases
discussed in Prowswood. In a Tenth Circuit case, the proffered excuse was the death of a
senior partner who was responsible for the litigation and that the attorney making the
motion had inherited voluminous matters as a result of the death. The attorney argued as a
basis that "through inadvertence and preoccupation with other matters, he neglected to file
the notice within the statutory period.53 Prowswood 676 P.2d at 960. The Tenth Circuit
held that this did not show excusable neglect. Id. The Ninth Circuit likewise rejected an

l

See also Gochis v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 16 F.3d 12,14 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding
attorney's misinterpretation of appellate rule not excusable neglect); U.S. v. Vaccaro? 51
F.3d 189,191 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); Advanced Estimating System. Inc. v. Riney, 130
F.3d 996, 997 (11th Cir. 1997) (no excusable neglect where attorney thought he had more
time to file Rule 59 motion which would have extended time to file notice of appeal).

excuse that the attorney "had been preoccupied with a change of employment and had been
unusually busy.33 Id.
The facts must demonstrate something beyond a simple miscalculation or other error
by counsel to support a finding of excusable neglect. The excuses advanced by the Serratos
are neither unique nor extraordinary. The Serratos argued before the trial court that
"plaintiffs3 counsel was excusably mistaken when he believed that August 31, 1999, was the
date that judgment was entered.33 That conclusion is not supportable.
NOTICE is hereby given pursuant to Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure that the Summary Judgment and Order of
Dismissal in the above-referenced matter was signed by the Honorable
Stephen L. Henriod on August 26,1999, and has been filed. Please
govern yourselves accordingly.
(R. 252-53) The notice, service of which does not affect the running of the time for

'

initiating an appeal, is unambiguous. Experienced counsel should know the provisions of
the appellate rules and be on notice that the clock was ranning by the time the Rule 58A
notice was received.
There is no question that neglect was involved in Serratos3 failure to timely file their
i

notice of appeal. However, neglect alone is an insufficient basis for permitting an appeal
after the 30-day period has run. Serratos3 proffered excuses do not reach the level of unique
or extraordinary circumstances to satisfy the requirement of excusable neglect. Moreover,
the trial court made no findings of excusable neglect. Granting permission to commence an
appeal under these circumstances is an abuse of discretion which simply converts the 30-day
time period into 60 days. Because the trial court improperly extended the time for appeal,

{

this Court lacks jurisdiction over Serratos5 appeal and it should be dismissed on that basis
without even reaching the merits of their arguments.
II.

THE SERRATOS3 FAILURE TO SERVE THEIR NOTICE OF CLAIM
ON UTA'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS BARS THEIR ACTION AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
The Governmental Immunity Act requires the service of a notice of claim by any

person having a claim against a governmental entity or its employees before initiating legal
action. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (2).2 The act specifies the contents of the requisite
notice and provides that it be "directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity
according to the requirements of § 63-30-12 or 63-30-13." Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-11 (3)(b)(ii). For claims against a political subdivision or its employees, the notice
of claim must be "filed with the governing body of the political subdivision . . ." within one
year of the date the claim arises. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (emphasis added).
UTA is a public transit district created pursuant to the Utah Public Transit District
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1001, etseq. By definition in the Governmental Immunity
Act, a public transit district is a political subdivision. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(7). UTA
is, therefore, a governmental entity and political subdivision of the State of Utah which is
subject to the provisions of the Act.
The powers of a transit district are performed by a board of directors. Utah Code
Ann. § 17A-2-1038(l). That board of directors is the "legislative body of the district,53

^ h e statutory provisions were amended in 1998. All citations in this brief are to the
version of the Act which was in effect when Serratos' claims arose.
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§ 17A-2-1039(l), and has power to pass ordinances and resolutions. § 17A-2-1039(8).
The powers contained in § 17A-2-1039 expressly endow the Board of Directors with the
authority to govern, making it the "governing body" for purposes of the filing of a notice of
claim under the Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13.
Application of the various statutory notice provisions leads to the inescapable
conclusion that a party having a claim against UTA must file a notice of claim complying
with the statutory requirements with UTA's Board of Directors before maintaining an
action and within one year from the date the claim arises.
The Serratos give only passing lip service to the judicial doctrine of strict compliance
with the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act and proceed to argue that
the rule should be construed flexibly where the governmental entity is otherwise on notice
of a potential claim. They also argue that "[i]t is extremely difficult to discern from the
statutes who is the UTA's governing body, let alone how to serve that body.53 They then
proceed to argue that because no member of the UTA Board of Directors would have seen
or read the notice, service on the Board as required by statute would be a futile act "which
the law abhors." None of these arguments is persuasive under Utah law which requires that
the notice of claim be served on the governing body, the UTA Board of Directors.
Contrary to the Serratos5 arguments, it is not difficult to identify and serve a notice
of claim on UTA5s governing body. Nor is it difficult to determine how to serve the
governing body, the Board of Directors. This is illustrated by the simple fact that Serratos
served their summons and complaint on the Board of Directors. (R. 5-7) The notice of

claim was drafted and served by legal counsel who is qualified to research, understand and
comply with the notice of claim requirements. Counsel was able to determine whom to
serve with the summons and complaint and likewise should have been able to determine the
proper service for the notice of claim.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistendy held that in the absence of a timely notice
of claim the governmental entity is not afforded sufficient knowledge to evaluate and
respond to the claim. Actual notice does not satisfy the requirement that a notice of claim
be filed. Scott v. School Bd. of Granite School Dist.. 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977); Sears v.
Southworth, 563 P.2d 192 (Utah 1977); Scarborough v. Granite School Dist.. 531 P.2d
480 (Utah 1975); Edwards v. Iron County. 531 P.2d 476 (Utah 1975); Varoz v. Sevey.
506 P.2d 435 (Utah 1973). The "vast majority of courts have held that actual notice to the
correct public entity, as opposed to actual service of the required written notice upon it, will
not suffice." Frasier, Annotation: Persons or Entities Upon Whom Notice of Personal
Injury or Claim Against State or State Agencies May or Must Be Served, 45 ALR5th 173
§ 2[a] at 191 (1997).
The controlling case with respect to the Serratos5 claims is Bellonio v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 1996). Though Serratos cite from Bellonio, their
selective references to the opinion are superficial and fail to deal with the substance of that
case. In Bellonio, the plaintiff had been injured at the Salt Lake International Airport and
had served what were arguably notices of claim on the attorney for the airport, the Utah
Attorney General, the Salt Lake City Attorney, and the Airport Director. The court in

Bellonio determined that the airport was not a separate governmental entity, but was a
division of Salt Lake City Corporation, and the governing body is the City Council.
Arguably, this made service somewhat more complicated than it is here where UTA is a
separate governmental entity created and identified by statute.
The plaintiff in Bdlonio, like the Serratos, argued the sufficiency of (1) constructive
notice to the governmental entity and (2) substantial compliance with the notice
requirements. Applying well-established rules of statutory construction, the court
determined that the term "governing body" was unambiguous and that the plain meaning
of the statute dictated that plaintiffs failure to file the notice with the governing body
barred his claims. Bellonio, 911 P.2d at 1296-97. The court also disagreed that the statute
should be interpreted "in an equitable fashion." Reviewing excerpts from Bischel v. Merritt,
907 P.2d 275 (Utah App.1995) and Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App.1994)
which the Serratos also rely on for support, the Bellonio court noted that while those
statements "may seem to indicate a flexible rule of constructive notice to governmental
entities, this is not the general rule in this state." Bellonio 911 P.2d at 1297. The court
went on to state that "Utah courts have typically required strict compliance with the notice
of claim requirements except in very limited circumstances." Id. (emphasis added). See also
Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 1999 UT 36,1119, 977 P.2d 1201,1203 (requiring stria
compliance and noting that c[a]ctual notice does not cure a party's failure to meet these
requirements").

The court distinguished the Bellonio facts from its prior decisions in Bischel and
Brittain where plaintifFs were permitted to proceed despite failure to strictly comply with
the notice requirements. The court asserted that:
the precedential effect of those cases is limited by their unique factual
underpinnings and, therefore, neither should be construed as an
indication that we are prepared to abrogate the long-standing rule
requiring strict compliance with all aspects of the Governmental
Immunity Act.
Id. (emphasis added).
The court's analysis in distinguishing the two prior cases merits a verbatim review:
In Brittain^ we determined that service of a notice of claim upon the
attorney general and upon the State Division of Risk Management
satisfied, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993), which requires service
upon the attorney general and upon the "agency concerned." 882 P.2d
at 672. Brittain^ however, is distinguishable from the present appeal
in that it involved section 12 rather than section 13 of the
Governmental Immunity Act. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12
(1993) with Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993). Therefore, while
this court found it reasonable to construe Risk Management as the
"agency concerned" in section 12, it does not follow, a fortiori, that the
Salt Lake City Attorney is the "governing body" of Salt Lake City in
section 13. In fact, in contradistinction to section 12, section 13
contains no indication that the City's legal counsel is entitled to any
notice of claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993).
Section 13, unlike section 12, contemplates that a notice of claim is
to be directed only to a political subdivision's governing body, not to
its legal counsel. This interpretation is consistent with the Utah
Supreme Court's earlier pronouncements that a primary purpose of the
notice of claim is to "afford the responsible public authorities an
opportunity to pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits
of a claim." Stahl, 618 P.2d at 482 (construing section 12) (emphasis
added).
Given our determination that section 13 requires service upon the
mayor and the city council, this court's recent opinion in Bischel
1n

requires some elucidation. In Bischel^ this court allowed a claim
against Salt Lake County to proceed despite the fact that the notice of
claim was, in fact, served upon the Salt Lake County Attorney, rather
than upon the Salt Lake County Commission as dictated by section
13. Bischel, 907 P.2d at 278. While Biscbel may, at first blush, appear
to be controlling in this case, that opinion was based upon a unique
set of facts which is absent in this appeal.
In Bischcl^ the plaintiff was unsure of how to serve the county
commission with a notice of claim; therefore, she did an entirely
sensible thing and called the commission to ask for instructions. Id.
She was instructed, by an agent of the commission, to serve her notice
of claim upon the Salt Lake County Attorney. Id. On those facts, this
court found that the plaintiff had complied with the statute, as
misinterpreted for her by the county commission. Id. at 279. Thus,
the end result in Bischd was not based upon a substantial compliance
or constructive notice theory, but rather was founded upon the
apparent agency of the commission employee. Id. at 278-79. The
inequity of allowing the commission to base its defense upon its
agent's misinformation prompted this court to utilize an estoppel-type
argument to prevent the commission from forging the shield of
governmental immunity into a sword. Id. at 279.
Bellonio at 1297-98 (emphasis added).
In analyzing Bnttain, it is important to underline the distinction between the broad
language in § 63-30-12, requiring service on "the agency concerned," and the much more
narrow and specific language in § 63-30-13, requiring service on "the governing body."
For example, in Brittain it was rational for the court to apply the broad language to
determine that the risk management division was, of the many state agencies, reasonably
treated as an "agency concerned." It is impossible, however, to use the same analysis to find
an alternative to "governing body" for purposes of serving UTA. UTA has, by law, only
one governing body.

Determining that the plaintiff had failed to serve the governing body, the Bellonio
court barred his claims for failure to properly serve a notice of claim. Id. 911 P.2d at 1298.
In Busch v. Salt Lake Infl Airport. 921 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1996), decided five
months after Bellonio. the plaintiff had served notice of claim against the airport on the Salt
Lake City Recorder and the Salt Lake City Attorney. He subsequently retained new
counsel who served the U.S. Attorney, Utah Attorney General, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake
City and the Salt Lake City Council. The court ruled that the first notice, served on the
recorder and attorney, was insufficient under the statute, but that the second one was valid
and was the notice which commenced the one-year period for filing of a complaint. Busch
921P.2dat472.
Another recent pronouncement by the Utah Supreme Court on the issue of service
of a notice of claim is contained in Larson v. Park City Municipal Corp.? 955 P.2d 343
(Utah 1998). In Larson, the plaintiff had served the city by following the procedures for
service of process under Rule 4(e)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requiring service
on the city recorder. The trial court dismissed the action because the plaintiff had not
served the governing body. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that service upon the city
recorder was sufficient for purposes of service of the notice of claim. The court discussed
the close relationship between the recorder and the city council, both statutorily and as a
practical reality, and concluded that a claimant could, regardless of the provisions of Rule 4,
reasonably and logically conclude from the statutes that it was proper to serve the city
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recorder. Larson 955 P.2d at 346. In discussing the elements leading to its conclusion, the
court noted seven significant ties between the recorder and the council.
In the case before us, Larson chose to file her notice of claim with
the city recorder of Park City inasmuch as rule 4 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure designates that person for service of summons and
complaint upon the city. A review of the Utah Municipal Code
indeed reveals that the city recorder has such a significant relationship
with the city council that one would be justified in filing notice of
claim with the recorder. For example, the city recorder is appointed
by the mayor with advice and consent of the city council. Utah Code
Ann. § 10-3-916. The city recorder is required to be located at the
place of the city council or somewhere convenient thereto. Id.
§ 10-6-137. The city recorder is required to attend the meetings of
the governing body and keep a record of the proceedings. Id. The
journal of the proceedings of the governing body is kept at the office
of the city recorder. Id. § 10-3-603. All ordinances must be deposited
in the office of the city recorder before they take effect. Id.
§ 10-3-711. Where a special meeting is required of the governing
body, it is the responsibility of the city recorder to give notice to each
member of the council personally or by leaving it at the member's
place of abode. Id. § 10-3-502. Petitions for annexation, objections
to those petitions, and amendments to those petitions are required to
be filed with the city recorder. Id. § 10-2-403 (Supp. 1997). And
when a lawsuit is filed against a city, the city entity is served by leaving
a copy of the summons and complaint with the city recorder. Utah R.
Civ. P. 4.
Larson 955 P.2d at 346.
The Larson holding does not apply to the Serratos3 notice. The analysis in Larson
turned on whether, based on the service provisions of Rule 4 and upon statutory provisions
dealing with municipal government, a party might reasonably believe that service of notice
on the city recorder was proper. Based upon those statutory provisions, the court held that
"the city recorder has such a significant relationship with the city council that one would be
justified in filing the notice of claim with the recorder." Larson 955 P.2d at 346.
20

In stark contrast, the UTA Risk Manager, Steven H. Cain, and Claims Adjuster
David C. Pitcher have no significant relationship with the UTA governing body and
therefore do not satisfy any of the criteria identified in Larson so as to justify service of the
notice of claim upon them. Moreover, there is no conflict between the requirement for
service on UTA3s governing body and any provision of Rule 4. There are also no statutory
provisions establishing any, much less a significant relationship between UTA's risk
manager or claims adjuster. Neither Steven H. Cain nor David C. Pitcher (1) is an officer
of UTA, (2) is a member of UTA3s Board of Directors, or (3) reports directly to the Board.
(R. 24-27) Moreover, Mr. Cain is effectively four levels removed from being an "executive
employee" or closely tied to the board of directors. His immediate supervisor is
Kenneth D. Montague, Jr., the Director of Finance. Mr. Montague in turn reports to the
General Manager, John M. Inglish, who in turn reports to the board of directors. (R. 146)
Mr. Pitcher is one level further removed from the Board. Serratos5 claims, therefore, are not
based upon any of the independent, objective indications in Larson. There is no reasonable,
objective basis for an individual to assume that Mr. Cain or Mr. Pitcher had the type of
"significant relationship33 with the governing body which was the basis of the Larson
decision.
The Serratos argument, to the effect that service of the notice of claim upon Cain
and Pitcher satisfies the purposes underlying the notice requirements, is in direct conflict
with the historical judicial requirement for strict compliance with the notice requirements.
This argument was rejected by this Court in Lamarr v. Dept. of Transp., 828 P.2d 535,
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540-41 (Utah App. 1992) (holding strict compliance with notice of claim provisions to be
jurisdictional). Serratos3 claim arises solely from a statutory waiver of governmental
immunity. As noted by the Bellonio court, "where a cause of action is based upon a statute,
full compliance with its requirements is a condition precedent to the right to maintain a
suit.53 Bellonio 911 P.2d at 1297 (citing Scarborough v. Granite School Dist.T 531 P.2d
480, 482 (Utah 1975)). Absent particularly unique circumstances, which are not present
here, strict compliance with the service of notice requirements is mandated by law.
Stahl v. Utah Transit Audu 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980) is neither applicable nor
helpful in this matter. Stahl dealt with service of a notice under provisions of Utah Code
Ann. § 11-20-56, the former Utah Public Transportation Act, which was subsequently
repealed and does not have a current replacement. Stahl might apply if § 11-20-56
governed the notice at issue here. The governing statute, however, is § 63-30-13, therefore
Stahl is inapplicable. Also, the Stahl court specifically excluded the Governmental
Immunity Act from its holding, noting that, unlike the Public Transportation Act, cc[t]he
Governmental Immunity Act makes clear that a failure to comply with the notice provision
results in a bar to prosecution of the action.35 Stahl at 481. Despite Serratos3 argument that
the equitable principles set forth in Stahl should control, § 63-30-13 is not interpreted ccin
an equitable fashion.53 Bellonio 911 P.2d at 1297.
Serratos also argue that because they were "advised by someone at the UTA33 that
Mr. Cain was authorized to accept their notice, the Bischel holding controls here. The
equitable basis for the holding in BischeL however, is lacking here. In BischeL the plaintiffs

attorney contacted the office of the County Commission and was specifically advised that
the notice should be served on a named individual at the County Attorney's office. The
attorney did not call "someone" at the county offices, but contacted a Commission
employee. The Serratos did not speak with an employee of the Board. Moreover, the
attorney in Bischel took the second step of contacting the designated deputy county
attorney who confirmed that she was the proper person upon whom to serve the notice.
Serratos did not contact Mr. Cain or Mr. Pitcher to verify that they were authorized by the
Board to accept service of a notice of claim. As noted by this Court in BeUomo, the
precedential effect of Bischel is "limited by [its] unique factual underpinnings." Bellonio
911 P.2d at 1297. The facts surrounding the Serratos3 service of notice do not fall within
those unique factual underpinnings. Moreover, "[a]s a general rule, estoppel may not be
invoked against a governmental entity. Anderson v. Public Service Comm3n? 839 P.2d 822,
827 (Utah 1992). An estoppel claim against a governmental entity generally requires
"specific written representations by authorized government entities.55 Id.
Nor do Serratos3 other case authorities support their arguments. In Tohnson v. City
of Bountiful, 996 F.Supp. 1100 (D. Utah 1998), the city advised the plaintiff on two
separate occasions that he would be fully compensated. Tohnson 996 F.Supp. at 1103. On
the basis of these representations and the plaintiffs reliance on them, the court estopped the
city from relying on the notice of claim defense. Neither Cain nor Pitcher made this type of
affirmative representation to Serratos. Rice v. Granite School Dist. 456 P.2d 159 (Utah
1969) involved a statute of limitation defense where there was an issue of fact whether the

district's agent induced the plaintiff to delay filing his lawsuit until after the statute had run.
Those facts do not apply here and the governmental immunity defense was not at issue in
Rice.
The Serratos also argue that the notice of claim may be filed by mail and that a
notice directed to the Board of Directors would never have come to the attention of the
Board. Both of these arguments are addressed by application of the rules of statutory
construction to the governing statutes. The Serratos further suggest that their notice of
claim is valid because the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-1 for mailing of notice
"shall be deemed filed35 and "received35 when mailed. This construction of the mailing
provisions has no support. The rules of statutory construction require that statutes "be so
construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and . . . interpretations are
to be avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd.35 Perrine v.
KennecottMin. Corp., 911 P.2d 1290,1292 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). If there is
any question as to the meaning or application of statutory provisions, the court must
analyze the provisions in their entirety and "harmonize [the] provisions in accordance with
the legislative intent and purpose.55 CIG Exploration, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm5n? 897
P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1996). If there appears to be a conflict between provisions of the
same act, the court must harmonize those provisions. Madsen v. BrownT 701 P.2d 1086,
1089-90 (Utah 1985). In addition, "a provision treating a matter specifically prevails over
an incidental reference made thereto in a provision treating another issue . . . because the

legislative mind is presumed to have stated its intent when it focused on the particular
issue.35 Id. 701 P.2d at 1090.
The Serratos3 proposed interpretation of § 63-37-1 fails under all of these rules. The
legislative intent in enacting the notice provisions was to limit the scope of the waiver of
sovereign immunity by requiring strict compliance with the statutory notice requirements.
If we accept Serratos3 construction, (1) the notice provisions are significantly broadened,
and (2) the specific provisions of §§ 63-30-11 and -13 become surplusage, a result to be
avoided in construing statutes. Moreover, the provisions of §§ 63-30-11 and -13 are more
specific whereas the provisions of § 63-37-1 are merely an incidental alternative for filing
the proper notice of claim. The logical and correct construction of these statutes is that
§ 63-37-1 provides only an alternative to personal service as a means of filing a notice of
claim which otherwise meets all of the requirements of §§ 63-30-11 and -13. If the notice
fails to meet the specific statutory requirements, e.g., service on the governing body, those
failings cannot be cured by simply mailing the notice to a UTA employee. Such a
construction would lead to an absurd result.
As a practical matter, to accept the Serratos3 argument would render meaningless all
of the service requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act. Mailing of a notice to
someone at UTA other than the Board of Directors, fails to satisfy the notice requirements.
In arguing otherwise, the Serratos seek to have this Court engage in judicial legislation to
alter the plain and unambiguous meaning of §§ 63-30-11 and -13. In essence, they argue
that if a plaintiflF improperly files a notice of claim and he can, by investigation or discovery,

determine that the governing body is minimally or not direcdy involved in handling,
litigating or settling claims, it is appropriate for the plaintiff to serve someone other than the
person or entity required by the unambiguous provisions of the statute.3 In any instance
where a governmental entity has designated an individual for the handling of claims, a
plaintiff would need only to serve that individual, contrary to the express provisions of the
Act. For example, where a claim involves UDOT, the current provision requires service
upon the Attorney General, who will not actually be involved with the case until a
complaint is filed. A plaintiff could merely serve the UDOT claims adjuster who was
reviewing the claim and avoid service on the Attorney General, in direct contradiction of the
express requirement of the statute.
In other words, Serratos encourage the Court to change the standard fixed by the
legislature to a flexible one, judicially imposed according to the facts and circumstances of
each case. Such a result is unsupported by law and is constitutionally prohibited. This
Court has no authority to strike down the legislatively imposed conditions on waivers of
governmental immunity. The Court should decline Serratos3 invitation to judicially amend
the legislative enactment.
The Serratos3 futility argument is spurious at best as is demonstrated by their case
authorities. Roundy v. Staley. 1999 Utah Ct. App. 229, 984 P.2d 404 dealt with the
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We note that delegation of authority by the UTA Board, regardless of the extent of
that delegation, is also a constitutionally impermissible way of altering the legislativelyenacted statute. UTA can no more change the applicable statutory language than can the
Serratos or the Court.

futility of objecting to presentation of evidence where the issue had been previously
preserved by moving to have the evidence produced to plaintiff. Futility of an action was
discussed in Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892 (Utah App. 1996) only in the dissenting
opinion and is not controlling law. Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292 (Utah App.
1989) dealt with tender of performance in a contracts case and found that tender in that
instance was not futile. None of these cases support the argument that strict compliance
with a statute which is jurisdictional to a cause of action may be avoided as futile.
The Serratos here have failed to serve the statutorily required notice of claim upon
the UTA Board of Directors. As noted in Bellonio, the statutes are clear that service must
be upon the Board. Bellonio also confirms that Serratos3 service upon the Utah Attorney
General does not satisfy the notice requirement. Nor does service upon UTA's Risk
Manager or Claims Adjuster. Neither of these individuals has a close or significant
relationship with the Board as was the case in Larson.
Because the Serratos failed to satisfy the notice of claim provisions of the
Governmental Immunity Act, the trial court correcdy granted summary judgment and
dismissed their claims. This Court should affirm that judgment.
IIL

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE SERRATOS5
CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS. THE UTAH
SAVINGS STATUTE THEREFORE DOES NOT PERMIT THE
SERRATOS TO RE-FILE THEIR NOTICE OF CLAIM AND THEIR
COMPLAINT.
The Serratos argue that the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 apply to

permit them to cure the jurisdictional deficiency in their action by filing a new notice of

claim and complaint within one year after dismissal of the present action. That argument is
unsupported by Utah law.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 permits refiling of a timely commenced action within
one year of dismissal of the original action "otherwise than upon the merits." The statute
does not provide for a renewed period within which to file a notice of claim. Even if the
savings statute applied to dismissal of the Serratos3 claims, their re-filed action would be
subject to the same failings-failure to file a proper notice of claim before expiration of the
notice period.
The Serratos seek support in Madsen v. Borthick 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983)
("Madsen F ) and Madsen v. BorthicL 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988^ ("Madsen I P ) , appeal
after remand, 850 P.2d 442 (Utah 1993). They fail, however, to recognize a significant
distinction between these Madsen cases and their own action. Madsen I affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs3 claims for failure to satisfy the notice of claim
requirements. In Madsen n ? "in an apparent attempt to avoid the notice requirement and
its then-expired time limit35 the plaintiffs did not sue the defendants in their official
capacities. Madsen II 769 P.2d at 247.4 This is distinction is not only significant but
controlling. The action against the defendants was in their individual capacities and stated
claims of gross negligence for which they were not immune under the Governmental
Immunity Act. Id. The Supreme Court held in Madsen II that res judicata did not apply

^ h e plaintiffs in Madsen II did not attempt to file a notice of claim and the court
did not direcdy address the issue of whether they could do so.

because the claims being alleged were not the same as the claims to which the notice
provisions were applicable. In other words, the court did not resurrect the expired notice of
claim period.
The filing of a notice of claim is not only a precondition to commencement of an
action, e.g., Madsen II at 254, but also cc[t]he notice of claim provisions of §§ 63-30-11 and
63-30-13 operate as a one-year statute of limitations in cases brought against a
governmental entity.53 Warren v. Provo City Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Utah 1992).
See also Bullock v. Dept. ofTransp.. 966 P.2d 1215, 1220 (Utah App. 1998) (holding
claim against State to be time-barred for failing to file timely notice of claim); Nielson v.
Gurley, 888 P.2d 130,134 (Utah App. 1994) ("Failure to comply with the notice
provisions of the Act deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.")
The Serratos5 claims are clearly distinguishable from those in Foil v. Ballings 601
P.2d 144 (Utah 1979) on which they also rely. In Foil the medical malpractice notice
requirement was not a statute of limitation and did not have the effect of barring an action.
McGuire v. Univ. of Utah Medical Center. 603 P.2d 786, 790 (Utah 1979). The result is
not the same where the notice provision is a statute of limitation. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court discussed the distinction between notice required under
the medical malpractice act and notice under the Governmental Immunity Act in Standard
Federal Sav. 8c Loan Ass'n v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136, 1128 (Utah 1991). Noting that a
claim against a governmental entity is barred under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 where the
notice requirement is not met, the court stated that cc[i]n the absence of such a plain
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expression of intent, we have generally read statutes that impose preconditions to filing suit
as establishing only procedural hurdles to suit, hurdles that can be cleared, rather than
absolute bars to suit." Kirkbride 821 P.2d at 1138. Citing Foil, the court recognized the
notice provision of the medical malpractice act as falling within the latter category. Id. In
C.P. v. Utah Office of Crime Victim's Reparations. 966 P.2d 1226,1229 (Utah App.
1998), this Court recognized the Kirkbride discussion of the governmental immunity notice
provisions as "an example of when the Legislature has provided a definite and finite time
period for filing that would preclude application of the general 'savings statute.333 C.P. 966
P.2d at 1226 n. 2 (emphasis added).
Consistent with these cases is Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352
(Utah 1980) in which the court found that claims against defendants dismissed for failure
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to comply with the notice requirements of the medical malpractice act were covered by the
savings provisions of § 78-12-40 and the claims against the governmental defendants
covered by the Governmental Immunity Act were different, affirming the trial court's
dismissal of these latter claims with prejudice. Yates 617 P.2d at 354.
3
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Contrary to the Serratos argument, their action was not "commenced within due
time33 as required by § 78-12-40 because it was commenced after the running of the oneyear statute of limitation in the Governmental Immunity Act. Failure to strictly comply
with the notice requirements, including the one-year limitation period, bars claims against a
governmental entity. There is, in other words, no action to save under § 78-12-40 and the
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trial court properly dismissed the Serratos3 claims with prejudice. This Court should
therefore affirm that dismissal.
CONCLUSION
The Serratos failed to commence their appeal within the requisite 30-day period and
the trial court's grant of an extension of time to appeal, absent a showing of excusable
neglect, was a reversible abuse of discretion. Because the appeal was not timely
commenced, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal and it must be dismissed.
Even if the Court examines the merits of the Serratos3 appeal, the trial court's legal
conclusions are correct under Utah law. The Serratos3 failure to timely and correctly file
their notice of claim bars their claims against UTA as a matter of law. There are no
equitable or other grounds for this Court to find otherwise, so it should affirm the trial
courts summary judgment ruling. Because failure to comply with the notice of claim
requirements precludes application of the savings statute, the trial court also correctly
dismissed the Serratos3 claims with prejudice. This Court should also affirm that dismissal.
JU
DATED this ^>_ day of May, 2000.
WILLIAMS & HUNT

^ |(*v4hAttorneys for Defendants/Appellees/
Cross-Appellants
79647.1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the <2w-> aav
ay of May, 2000, two (2) true and correct
copies of the foregoing Combined Appellees and Cross-Appellant's Brief were mailed by
first class mail, postage prepaid thereon, to:
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees
G. Eric Nielson
Bertch&Birch
Commerce Center, Suite 100
5296 South Commerce Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
James Haslam
2539 North 800 West
Lehi, UT 84043
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December 2, 1997
NOTICE OF CLAIM FOR INJURY

Steven Cain, Risk Manager
Utah Transit Authority
3600 South 700 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119

BY PERSONAL SERVICE

Jan Graham
Attorney General of the State of Utah
23 6 South Capital Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
David C. Pitcher, AIC
Utah Transit Authority
3600 South 700 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119

BY PERSONAL SERVICE

RE:

My Clients:
Date of Injury:

BY PERSONAL SERVICE

Cristobal and Elida Serrato
12/17/96

Dear Ms. Graham and Messrs. Cain and Pitcher:
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§63-30-11, et sea. , (1995), as
amended, you are hereby put on notice that my clients, Cristobal
and Elida Serrato, have a claim for injury against the Utah Transit
Authority and Lance K. Sargent, the driver of one of it!s buses,
for personal injuries arising out of an automobile/bus collision on
or about December 17, 1996. This claim arises from the following
facts.
A BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS; THE NATURE
OF THE CLAIM ASSERTED; AND, THE DAMAGES
INCURRED BY THE CLAIMANTS SO FAR
AS THEY ARE KNOWN
On December 17, 1996, at approximately 6:40 am, Cristobal Serrato
was driving his truck eastbound on 4715 South, on his way to work.
Elida, Cristobal's wife, was riding with him. At the intersection
of 4420 West and 4715 South, a UTA bus turned left in front of my
client's vehicle.
The driver of the UTA bus, Mr. Sargent, was negligent for failing
to keep a proper lookout, failure to yield the xri^JKSs. {^^^^f^Ml^y
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NOTICE OF CLAIM
Cristobal and Elida Serrato
December 2, 1997
Page 2

dangerous left hand turn and failure to obey a traffic control
device. As a result of the negligence of the driver of the bus, my
clients have suffered serious personal injuries.
As a result of the collision, Cristobal Serrato has sustained
injuries to his neck, back and shoulders. Mr. Serrato has incurred
medical expenses, lost wages and will likely incur future medical
expenses related to the injuries suffered in this incident.
My client Elida Serrato has sustained injuries to her face, head,
and back, including multiple lacerations about her neck and face
and broken teeth. Mrs. Serrato has incurred medical expenses, lost
wages and will likely incur future medical expenses related to the
injures suffered in this incident.
Furthermore, Mrs. Serrato
appears to have symptoms consistent with a closed-head injury.
As a result of the negligence of the bus driver, my clients have
suffered mental and physical pain and suffering, inconvenience and
interference with the normal activities of daily living apart from
gainful employment.
Neither Cristobal nor Elida Serrato are under the age of majority
or mentally incompetent.
Sincerely,
BERTCH & BIRCH

Steven R. Paul
Attorney for Claimants
SRP/sp

ADDENDUM A-2

JODY K. BURNETT (A0499)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defandants
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CRISTOBAL SERRATO and ELIDA
SERRATO,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN H. CAIN
:

v.
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY and LANCE K.
SARGENT,

Civil No. 980903929PI
Judge Judith Atherton

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
The undersigned, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am the Risk Manager for the Utah Transit Authority and have held that position

and job title since December 9,1996.
2.

In summary, my responsibilities include design, implementation and

administration of UTA's Risk Management Programs including risk identification, evaluation,
control, financing, insurance programs, claims administration, safety, and security programs.
3.

My supervisor is the Director of Finance, Kenneth D. Montague, Jr.

4.

I am not an officer of UTA.

5.

I am not a member of the Board of Directors of UTA or an executive employee or

secretary to the Board of Directors.
6.

I am not a registered agent of UTA authorized to receive service of process on its

7.

I was not hired by the Board of Directors of UTA and do not report to the Board

behalf.

of Directors.
8.

It is not part of my job responsibilities to attend Board of Director's meetings and

I do not routinely do so.
9.

I do not keep any minutes or records of the Board of Directors.

10.

I am not involved in providing notice of Board of Directors meetings.

DATED this / —

day of

ZJmy

_, 1998.

Steven H. Cain
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J_

^ NOTARY PUBLIC

., 1998.

«E
Notary Public
(0*-y*~'

3600 South 700 W**t
_ S.LC.VUT 84115

K

if# ij
STATE Of UTAH

day of

Residing in: ^L

(L.

|
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ADDENDUM A-3

JODY K. BURNETT (A0499)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defandants
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CRISTOBAL SERRATO and ELIDA
SERRATO,

:
:

Plaintiffs,

:

AFFIDAVIT OF
DAVID C. PITCHER

V.

UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY and LANCE K.
SARGENT,

Civil No. 980903929PI
Judge Judith Atherton

.

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

__

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
The undersigned, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am the claims adjustor for the Utah Transit Authority and have held that position

and job title since May, 1996.
2.

In summary, my responsibilities include the supervision and handling of all

claims, recovery, and litigation for which UTA is self insured. I am also responsible for assisting
the Risk Manager in the evaluation and purchase of insurance, as well as training employees and
consulting with other departments on claims and recovery related issues.
3.

My supervisor is the Risk Manager, Steven A. Cain.

4.

I am not an officer of UTA.

5.

I am not a member of the Board of Directors of UTA or an executive employee or

secretary to the Board of Directors.
6.

I am not a registered agent of UTA authorized to receive service of process on its

7.

I was not hired by the Board of Directors of UTA and do not report to the Board

behalf.

of Directors.
8.

It is not part of my job responsibilities to attend Board of Director's meetings and

I do not routinely do so.
9.

I do not keep any minutes or records of the Board of Directors.

10.

I am not involved in providing notice of Board of Directors meetings.

DATED this

1

day of

CTol^

, 1998.

avid C. Pitcher
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

/

^ju*~\J~
^ NOTARY PUBLIC
DIANNE8UECURUEY
3600 SoiA? mo West
J5.LC.tr! 34-15
COMMISSION EXPIRES
NOV 15,2001
STATE OF UTAH

Notary Public
Residing in: c p Z -

ADDENDUM A-4

JODY K BURNETT (A0499)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendants
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P. O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CRISTOBAL SERRATO and ELIDA
SERRATO,

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF
DISMISSAL

Plaintiffs,

UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY and
LANCE K. SARGENT,

Civil No. 980903929PI
Judge Stephen L. Henriod

Defendants.
TO THE PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

NOTICE is hereby given pursuant to Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure that the Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal in die above-referenced
matter was signed by the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod on August 26, 1999, and has
been filed. Please govern yourselves accordingly.
DATED this ?l

day of August. 1999.
WILLIAMS & HUNT

By

fy^w^CT
Jody
Attorrfe/s for Defendants

74778.1

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

Beverly Riemann, being duly sworn, says that she is employed in die law offices of
Williams & Hunt, attorneys for defendants herein; that she served the attached NOTICE
OF ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL in
Case No. 980903929PI before the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, upon die parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy diereof in an
envelope addressed to:
Counsel for Plaintiffs
G. Eric Nielson
Steven R. Paul
BERTCH& BIRCH
5296 S. Commerce Drive, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
and causing die same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on die 31st day of
August, 1999.
^ yjuJU. r L >
Beverly Riemtfnn

&

"V'1

^V~\r

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 31st day of August, 1999.

rwmm •MyR*1 -mw
MARY C WARDfLL
tattUtoCtoUta
^MUNtOte
Utah 84111
%CemmWon
*«7.2000

I
I
|

*5»ofUt*
•
• • • • • J
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ADDENDUM A-5

HUD DISTRICT

mm

* Third Judicial Distnct

m-*Z

G. Eric Nielson (#5327)
BERTCH & BIRCH, L.C.
Commerce Center, Suite 100
5296 South 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-5300
Facsimile: (801) 262-2111
Attorneys for Plaintiff

THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CRISTOBAL SERRATO and ELIDA
SERRATO,
Plaintiff,

)
]
)
]I

ORDER RE: MOTION TO EXTEND
TIME TO APPEAL

V.

UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY and
LANCE K. SARGENT,
Defendants.

:

)
;
)

Civil No. 980903929 PI
Judge Henriod

)

The Court, having considered plaintiffs' Motion to Extend Time to Appeal, and good
cause appearing therefore, said request is granted.

Dated this

y

day of November, 1999.
THIRD DISTRICT COURT

> / - i"

i' r~- •

Judge Henriod
^^V/TT-

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Jody ffl Burne
/Attorney for Defendants

.

^

^

G. Eric Nielson
Attorney for Plaintiffs

»
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